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Abstract
This paper outlines new paradigms for real analysis and computabil-
ity theory in the recently proposed non-Aristotelian finitary logic (NAFL).
Constructive real analysis in NAFL (NRA) is accomplished by a trans-
lation of diagrammatic concepts from Euclidean geometry into an exten-
sion (NPAR) of the NAFL version of Peano Arithmetic (NPA). Such a
translation is possible because NPA proves the existence of every infi-
nite proper class of natural numbers that is definable in the language of
NPA. Infinite sets are not permitted in NPAR and quantification over
proper classes is banned; hence Cantor’s diagonal argument cannot be
legally formulated in NRA, and there is no ‘cardinality’ for any collection
(‘super-class’) of real numbers. Many of the useful aspects of classical
real analysis, such as, the calculus of Newton and Leibniz, are justifiable
in NRA. But the paradoxes, such as, Zeno’s paradoxes of motion and
the Banach-Tarski paradox, are resolved because NRA admits only closed
super-classes of real numbers; in particular, open/semi-open intervals of
real numbers are not permitted. The NAFL version of computability the-
ory (NCT) rejects Turing’s argument for the undecidability of the halting
problem and permits hypercomputation. Important potential applications
of NCT are in the areas of quantum and autonomic computing.
1 Introduction to NAFL
The basic description of non-Aristotelian finitary logic (NAFL) given in [1, 2,
3, 4] is outlined below for the sake of completeness. The language, well-formed
formulae and rules of inference of NAFL theories are formulated in exactly the
same manner as in classical first-order predicate logic with equality (FOPL),
where we shall assume, for convenience, that natural deduction is used; how-
ever, there are key differences and restrictions imposed by the requirements of
the Main Postulate of NAFL, which is defined below. In NAFL, truths for
formal propositions can exist only with respect to axiomatic theories. There
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are no absolute truths in just the language of an NAFL theory, unlike classi-
cal/intuitionistic/constructive logics. There do exist absolute (metamathemat-
ical, Platonic) truths in NAFL, but these are truths about axiomatic theories
and their models. As in FOPL, an NAFL theory T is defined to be consistent
if and only if T has a model, and a proposition P is undecidable in T if and
only if neither P nor its negation ¬P is provable in T. The truth definition
given below in the Main Postulate is the heart of NAFL and its vital impor-
tance is underscored by Proposition 1, which follows it. The existing mindset
that “truth definitions are not part of logic” most emphatically does not hold
of NAFL.
1.1 The Main Postulate of NAFL
Let P be a legitimate proposition of a consistent NAFL theory T. We will see in
Sect. 1.2 that legitimacy of a proposition requires it to be in the ‘theory syntax’
of T. If P is provable/refutable in T, then P is true/false with respect to T
(henceforth abbreviated as ‘true/false in T’); i.e., a model for T will assign P to
be true/false. If P is undecidable in a consistent NAFL theory T, then the Main
Postulate provides the appropriate truth definition as follows: P is true/false
in T if and only if P is provable/refutable in an interpretation T* of T. Here
T* is an axiomatic NAFL theory that, like T, temporarily resides in the human
mind and acts as a ‘truth-maker’ for (a model of) T. The theorems of T* are
precisely those propositions that are assigned ‘true’ in the NAFL model of T,
which, unlike its classical counterpart, is not ‘pre-existing’ and is instantaneously
generated by T*. Obviously, the theorems of T must necessarily be included in
those of T*. Note that for a given consistent theory T, T* could vary in time
according to the free will of the human mind that interprets T; for example, T*
could be T+P or T+¬P or just T itself at different times for a given human
mind, or in the context of quantum mechanics, for a given observer. Further,
T* could vary from one observer to another at any given time; each observer
determines T* by his or her own free will. The essence of the Main Postulate
is that P is true/false in T if and only if it has been axiomatically declared as
true/false by virtue of its provability/refutability in T*. In the absence of any
such axiomatic declarations, i.e., if P is undecidable in T* (e.g. take T*=T),
then P is ‘neither true nor false’ in T and Proposition 1 shows that consistency
of T requires the laws of the excluded middle and non-contradiction to fail in a
non-classical model for T in which the superposition P&¬P is the case.
Proposition 1. Let P be undecidable in a consistent NAFL theory T. Then
P ∨¬P and ¬(P&¬P ) are not theorems of T. There must exist a non-classical
model M for T in which P&¬P is the case.
For a proof of Proposition 1, see [1] or [4]; this proof, also reproduced in
Appendix A, seriously questions the logical/philosophical basis for the law of
non-contradiction in both classical and intuitionistic logics. The non-classical
modelM of Proposition 1 is a superposition of two or more classical models for
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T, in at least one of which P is true and ¬P in another. Here ‘classical’ or ‘non-
classical’ is used strictly with respect to the status of P , and ‘superposition’
means that all the truths in each of the superposed classical models must hold
in the non-classical model M. Thus if P is true in one classical model and
¬P in another, the superposed state P&¬P will hold when these two classical
models are superposed to form M. In M, ‘P ’ (‘¬P ’) denotes that ‘¬P ’ (‘P ’)
is not provable in T*, or in other words, M expresses that neither P nor ¬P
has been axiomatically declared as (classically) true with respect to T; thus P ,
¬P , and hence P&¬P , are indeed (non-classically) true in our world, according
to their interpretation in M. Note also that P and ¬P are classically ‘neither
true nor false’ in M, where ‘true’ and ‘false’ have the meanings given in the
Main Postulate. The quantum superposition principle is justified by identifying
‘axiomatic declarations’ of truth/falsity of P in T (via its provability/refutability
in T*) with ‘measurement’ in the real world [1, 2, 3, 4].
Proposition 1 is a metatheorem, i.e., it is a theorem about axiomatic theories.
The concepts in Proposition 1, namely, consistency, undecidability (provability)
and the existence of a non-classical model for a theory and hence, quantum
superposition and entanglement, are strictly metamathematical (i.e., pertaining
to semantics or model theory) and not formalizable in the syntax of NAFL theo-
ries. An NAFL theory T is either consistent or inconsistent, and a proposition P
is either provable or refutable or undecidable in T, i.e., the law of the excluded
middle applies to these metamathematical truths. Note that the existence of
a non-classical model does not make T inconsistent or paraconsistent, because
T does not prove P&¬P . However, one could assert that the model theory for
T requires the framework of a paraconsistent logic, in which the non-classical
models can be analyzed. NAFL is the only logic that correctly embodies the
philosophy of formalism [2]; NAFL truths for formal propositions are axiomatic,
mental constructs with strictly no Platonic world required.
1.2 Theory syntax and proof syntax
An NAFL theory T requires two levels of syntax, namely the ‘theory syntax’ and
the ‘proof syntax’. The theory syntax consists of precisely those propositions
that are legitimate, i.e., whose truth in T satisfies the Main Postulate; obviously,
the axioms and theorems of T are required to be in the theory syntax. Further,
one can only add as axioms to T those propositions that are in its theory syntax.
In particular, neither P&¬P nor its negation P ∨ ¬P is in the theory syntax
when P is undecidable in T; this will be clear from the explanation given below.
The proof syntax, however, is classical because NAFL has the same rules of
inference as FOPL; thus ¬(P&¬P ) is a valid deduction in the proof syntax and
may be used to prove theorems of T. For example, if one is able to deduce
A ⇒ P&¬P in the proof syntax of T where P is undecidable in T and A is in
the theory syntax, then one has proved ¬A in T despite the fact that ¬(P&¬P )
is not a theorem (in fact not even a legitimate proposition) of T. This is justified
as follows: ¬(P&¬P ) may be needed to prove theorems of T, but it does not
follow in NAFL that the theorems of T imply ¬(P&¬P ) if P is undecidable in
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T. Let A and B be undecidable propositions in the theory syntax of T. Then
A⇒ B (equivalently, ¬A∨B) is in the theory syntax of T if and only if A⇒ B
is not (classically) deducible in the proof syntax of T. It is easy to check that if
A ⇒ B is deducible in the proof syntax of T, then its (illegal) presence in the
theory syntax would force it to be a theorem of T, which is not permitted by
the Main Postulate. For, in a non-classical modelM for T in which both A and
B are in the superposed state (i.e., both A&¬A and B&¬B hold), A&¬B must
be non-classically true, but theoremhood of A ⇒ B will prevent the existence
ofM. If one replaces B by A in this result, one obtains the previous conclusion
that ¬(A&¬A) is not in the theory syntax. For example, take T0 to be the null
set of axioms. Then nothing is provable in T0, i.e., every legitimate proposition
P of T0 is undecidable in T0. Hence P&¬P must be satisfiable in a non-classical
model for T0; this is obviously true, for P&¬P contradicts only P ∨¬P , which is
not in the theory syntax (and hence cannot be a theorem) of T0. In particular,
the proposition (A&(A ⇒ B)) ⇒ B, which is deducible in the proof syntax of
T0 (via the modus ponens inference rule), is not in the theory syntax; however, if
A⇒ B is not deducible in the proof syntax of T0, then it is in the theory syntax.
Note also that ¬¬A ⇔ A is not in the theory syntax of T0; nevertheless, the
‘equivalence’ between ¬¬A and A holds in the sense that one can be replaced
by the other in every model of T0, and hence in all NAFL theories. Indeed, in
a non-classical model for T0, this equivalence holds in a non-classical sense and
must be expressed by a different notation [2].
2 Infinite Sets Do Not Exist in NAFL Theories
Consider set theory with classes and assume that the only mathematical objects
permitted to belong to classes are sets. A class is specified as an extension
of a definite property in the language of set theory. Let P (x) be one such
property of sets, in which all variables (bound and unbound) are restricted
to be set variables and in which finitely many independently defined constant
class symbols may appear. We denote the class C associated with P (x) as
∀x[x ∈ C ⇔ P (x)] or more concisely, C = {x : P (x)}. Certain classes may be
sets; a proper class is a collection that is deemed to be not a set and therefore
cannot belong to any class. The universe of a model for a theory is a nonempty
class U over which all the variables of the theory range. The theory of finite
sets F, with classes, may be obtained by removing the axiom of infinity (AI)
from either Zermelo’s set theory with classes (Z) [6, Chaps. 1 and 5], or from
Go¨del-Bernays theory (GB) [7, pp. 73–78]. That every property expressible in
the language determines a class is a theorem scheme of GB [7, pp. 76–77] and
in particular, of F; we denote this as the theorem of comprehension for classes.
The natural numbers in F are defined in the usual set-theoretic sense, with 0
as the empty set ∅ and n+ 1 = n ∪ {n}. The class N of all natural numbers is
defined by
N = {x : x is a natural number}.
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Note that we have admitted “x is a natural number” as a valid property in the
language of F. Consider the class D, defined as:
D = {x : ∀n(n ∈ N⇒ x /∈ ℘(n)(∅))}. (1)
Here ℘(n)(∅) is the power set operation performed n times on the null set ∅; we let
℘(0)(∅) = ∅. Note that D exists provably in F by the theorem of comprehension.
Consider the following proposition:
D = ∅. (2)
According to the standard interpretation, (2) is undecidable in F, for the follow-
ing reason. Define a model B for F in which only finite sets exist; the universe
B of B is given by
B = {x : ∃n(n ∈ N & x ∈ ℘(n)(∅))}. (3)
In the interpretation of B, D = ∅ holds and hence (2) is true. But in a model
in which infinite sets do exist, (2) is false.
Theorem 1. The proposition D = ∅ defined in (2) is required to be provable
in F by the Main Postulate of NAFL and Proposition 1. Consequently, infinite
sets do not exist in the NAFL version of F.
Proof. We will outline the proof given in [5, Sect. 3]. Uniqueness of D is de-
ducible from the axiom of extensionality for classes (AE), which implies:
D = ∅ ∨ D 6= ∅. (4)
The key point is that AE requires (4) (equivalent to ¬(D = ∅ & D 6= ∅)) to be
a theorem of F. But by Proposition 1, (4) cannot be a theorem of F, given that
F is consistent and that (2) is undecidable in F. We are forced to the conclusion
that one of these two “givens” must be false in NAFL. Either (2) is undecidable
in F, which is therefore inconsistent, or else (2) must be decidable in F.
What we have demonstrated is that if F is to be a consistent theory of NAFL,
then we need a principle of proof for either D = ∅ or for D 6= ∅. We will argue
the case for D = ∅. The axioms of F tacitly presume that a definite class U is
specified as the universe, because these formulas contain the universal quantifiers
∀ and ∃ which may be thought of as referring to the universe. However, to
define U we need to consider the formulas of F as meaningful because these
assert the existence of sets that must necessarily belong to U . Thus both U and
all the sets of F are impredicatively defined. However, finite sets may also be
defined predicatively, at least in principle, merely by listing all of their elements;
but this is not possible for infinite sets. In conclusion, infinite sets can only be
defined impredicatively, i.e., by self-reference via the universal class (which must
again be defined impredicatively by reference to infinite sets). The appropriate
principle of proof in NAFL for D = ∅ is that such an impredicative definition of
sets must be banned, for it generates undecidable propositions that contradict
the Main Postulate of NAFL.
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Remark 1. Note that Theorem 1 is a metatheorem and its proof required Propo-
sition 1. Classically, it is not known whetherD = ∅ is either provable or refutable
or undecidable in F; the undecidability is merely assumed. What Theorem 1
predicts is that by the classical rules of inference, the theory F + (D 6= ∅) must
be inconsistent. In other words, Theorem 1 proves that F proves (2) (assuming
consistency of F), but does not provide a specific proof in F of (2).
Remark 2. The proof of Theorem 1 illustrates a very important requirement
of NAFL. Whenever an NAFL theory proves that a class or a set must exist
uniquely (e.g. via AE), then Proposition 1 requires that such uniqueness must
be enforced with respect to that theory, rather than just with respect to models
of that theory. Thus the theory is also required to provide a unique construc-
tion for the class or set in question. E.g. NAFL requires the theory F to specify
the class D uniquely; it is not valid in NAFL to assert that either D = ∅ or
D 6= ∅ can hold in models of F, for then uniqueness is lost with respect to F.
One can immediately conclude that non-Euclidean geometries are inconsistent
in NAFL [5, 15], for Euclid’s first four postulates prove that there must exist
a unique straight line between any two distinct points. The uniqueness here
must again be enforced with respect to a theory comprising the first four pos-
tulates, which implies that such a theory must provide a construction for the
said straight line via provability of the fifth postulate.
3 Infinite proper classes must provably exist in
NAFL theories with infinite domains
Proposition 2. If T is a consistent NAFL theory that proves the existence of
infinitely many objects identifiable by a property P (x) in the language of T (e.g.
P (x) could be ‘x = x’ with T taken as Peano Arithmetic) then T must prove
the existence of the infinite proper class {x : P (x)}.
Note that Proposition 2 addresses only infinite classes; there is no such corre-
sponding result for finite classes (or sets). In a sense the axioms for the existence
of infinite classes in the theory F of Sect. 2 are redundant; by Proposition 2,
they must be provable in the NAFL version of F, and the language of F must
necessarily include the required properties that specify the infinite classes.
Proof. The simplest proof is as follows. Consider the NAFL version of Peano
Arithmetic (NPA; see Appendix B), which is equivalent to F. From Theorem 1,
it follows in NAFL that nonstandard models of NPA cannot exist. For the Main
Postulate of NAFL (see Sect. 1) requires that models of NPA must necessarily
be specified by its interpretation NPA*, which is also an NAFL theory that
denies the existence of infinite sets (by Theorem 1). But without infinite sets,
nonstandard models of arithmetic cannot be specified and therefore cannot exist
in NAFL. It immediately follows that the only model of NPA is the standard
model and hence, by the completeness theorem of first-order logic, NPA must
prove the existence of the domain of standard natural numbers specified by
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the class N defined in Sect. 2 (in the language of NPA, N may be specified
as {x : x = x}). This result is immediately generalized and Proposition 2
follows.
Remark 3. Note that the completeness theorem of classical first-order logic,
which speaks about axiomatic theories, is taken for granted in NAFL as a meta-
mathematical principle, but is not provable in any NAFL theory because of
the infinitary reasoning required; in fact the notion of ‘axiomatic theory’ is not
even formalizable in NAFL theories. The nonexistence of nonstandard models
of NPA also follows from the arguments given in [2, Sect. 1], which raise seri-
ous questions about the existence of nonstandard integers even within classical
logic. Indeed, undecidability of the Go¨del sentence for NPA immediately pro-
duces a contradiction similar to that discussed in the proof of Theorem 1. It
follows as a corollary that consistency of NPA demands its completeness, i.e.,
every sentence of NPA must be either provable or refutable in NPA. This re-
sult, together with Theorem 1, means that one no longer has the freedom to
invoke infinite sets to prove purely arithmetical propositions, as is done classi-
cally. Obviously, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems and Turing’s argument for
the undecidability of the halting problem fail in NAFL, as discussed in [2] and
[4]. Another consequence of the nonexistence of nonstandard models is that an
‘arbitrary but fixed’ constant does not exist in NAFL; it is the same as a free
variable and assumed to be universally quantified with respect to a standard
domain (e.g. natural numbers). The Main Postulate requires that the free (or
universally quantified) variable is in a superposed state of all possible values [2]
and assumes a particular value when and only when it is specified by the human
mind that interprets the theory in question.
Remark 4. An intuitive and useful explanation for the validity of Proposition 2
is as follows. In NAFL, the process of counting one or finitely many natural
numbers at a time will not exhaust ‘all’ the natural numbers. A simple induction
tells us that such a counting process will always leave out infinitely many nat-
ural numbers, and so will never be complete. Yet NPA obviously specifies ‘all’
natural numbers; it can only do so by accessing (at some unspecified point in
the counting process) infinitely many natural numbers at the same time. Thus
NPA must prove the existence of the infinite proper class of natural numbers,
which may be thought of as the simultaneous existence of ‘all’ natural numbers.
A class is identified by all of its elements, as required by AE. When a theory
‘constructs’ all the elements of an infinite class, it must unavoidably construct
the class itself. Proposition 2 is a metatheorem; it proves that T must prove the
existence of the infinite class {x : P (x)}, but does not provide the said proof
in T. The proof in T that infinitely many elements exist that satisfy P (x) may
also be taken as the proof in T of the existence of {x : P (x)}. For example, if
P (x) expresses that ‘x is a natural number’ (say, via P (x) ≡ ‘x = x′) in the
theory NPA, one might take the proof in NPA of the existence of the infinite
class N = {x : P (x)} as that of the proposition ∀n∃m(m > n).
Remark 5. It is clear from Proposition 2 and Remark 4 that an NAFL theory
T always identifies an infinite class {x : P (x)} by all of its elements. In fact
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{x : P (x)} can only be so identified as an infinite class, i.e., in the extensional
sense. Thus the axiom of extensionality for classes, in those instances where
infinite classes are involved, is built into the very definition of the word ‘class’
and must also be provable in every NAFL theory T that proves the existence of
infinitely many objects.
Proposition 3. ‘Arbitrary’ infinite classes and quantification over infinite classes
(which are equivalent; see Remark 3) are not permitted in NAFL theories. An
infinite (proper) class must always be a constant that is specified constructively
in NAFL theories, via a mapping to the class N of all natural numbers (which
is assumed to be a constructive specification). This mapping must be shown to
exist even when one is unable to specify a general formula for it (e.g. the class
of all prime natural numbers).
Proposition 3 emphasizes the difference between an infinite set (which is a
mathematical object in classical logic) and an infinite proper class. Quantifica-
tion over proper classes amounts to treating these as sets.
Proof. From Proposition 2 and Remark 3, it is clear that Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorems (and Turing’s argument for the unsolvability of the halting problem)
must fail in NAFL. To justify such a failure, one must impose a ban on quantifi-
cation over proper classes. The proofs of Go¨del’s theorems (as well as those of all
versions of Turing’s argument for the undecidability of the halting problem [4])
always require quantification over infinitely many infinite proper classes. The
said quantification in various versions of the proofs of these theorems appears
either directly (e.g. via Cantor’s diagonalization argument) or indirectly, e.g.
when one encodes self-referential sentences into Peano Arithmetic using Go¨del
numbering. In other words, Go¨del’s theorems and Turing’s argument serve as
reductio ad absurdum proofs of the infinitary nature, and hence, invalidity in
NAFL, of quantification over proper classes. Indeed, the very fact that nonstan-
dard models of arithmetic follow as a logical consequence of Go¨del’s theorems
and Turing’s argument is proof of their infinitary nature.
4 Foundations of Real Analysis in NAFL
Extend NPA to the NAFL theory NPAR in which the integers (Z), rationals (Q)
and sequences of rationals (〈qn〉), including Cauchy sequences, are defined. See
Appendix B for the definitions of NPA and NPAR. By Propositions 2 and 3,
NPAR must prove the existence of every Cauchy sequence of rationals definable
by formulas (‘properties’) in the language of NPAR. The usual extension of
NPAR to treat real numbers as equivalence classes of such Cauchy sequences is
not possible, for direct quantification over reals is banned. Neither can we talk
of an arbitrary real number x (in the usual sense, with no construction specified
for x) in NAFL, for that amounts to quantification, via Proposition 3; however,
see also Remark 10. Nevertheless, indirect quantification over reals may be
accomplished by a metamathematical translation of diagrammatic concepts of
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Euclidean geometry into operations on sequences of rationals in NPAR. We
denote as NRA the appropriate NAFL metatheory (to be defined below) of
NPAR in which this translation is performed.
Definition 1. In NRA, we associate real numbers with ‘points’ on the real
line, which exists a priori as a geometric entity. Euclidean geometry and its
diagrammatic concepts are taken for granted as true. In NRA, every mention
of a constant real number r (e.g. π) must be accompanied by a ‘construction’
for r, namely, a specific Cauchy sequence of rationals (that classically converges
to r); ‘non-constructive’ existence of real numbers is not permitted in NAFL
(see Proposition 3). Any such Cauchy sequence is appropriate in a given in-
stance, and different sequences may be used in different instances to represent
the same real number. In NRA, a constant real number r is specified only after
a Cauchy sequence representing it has been displayed. Define addition, subtrac-
tion, multiplication and division of reals by corresponding termwise operations
on the rationals in the Cauchy sequences representing the reals; we do not permit
sequences containing zero terms to represent the denominator of a quotient of re-
als. These definitions, adapted from [8], are as follows. If x = 〈qn〉 and y = 〈q′n〉
are real numbers, we write x =R y in NRA to mean that limn |qn− q′n| = 0, i.e.,
in NPAR,
∀ǫ(ǫ > 0⇒ ∃m∀n(m < n⇒ |qn − q′n| < ǫ)),
and we write x <R y in NRA to mean that
∃ǫ(ǫ > 0 & ∃m∀n(m < n⇒ qn + ǫ < q′n))
holds in NPAR. Similarly, we also make the following translations in NRA to
formulas of NPAR:
x+R y → 〈qn + q′n〉
x ·R y → 〈qn · q′n〉
−R x→ 〈−qn〉
x/Ry → 〈qn/q′n〉, where q′n 6= 0
0R → 〈0〉; 1R → 〈1〉.
We have dropped the subscript Q from the relations ·, /, +, −, < and > on the
rationals, as well as from the symbols 0 and 1 (as defined in Appendix B). We
will henceforth drop the subscript R on these relations and symbols for the reals
as well.
Remark 6. Note that the expression ‘π/
√
2’ by itself makes no sense in NAFL
unless Cauchy sequences representing π and
√
2 are also specified. The result
will be again be a specific Cauchy sequence. Of course, in this case we know
that any such resulting sequence will always represent the same real number.
Consider the expression ‘0/0’, where the numerator and denominator are again
specified as Cauchy sequences representing the real number zero. The answer
in this case will be dependent on how we specify these sequences, and may cor-
respond to different real numbers in different instances, or may not converge
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at all. Whenever the answer converges, 0/0 is a well-defined operation in the
NAFL version of real analysis. This is so because we do not require 0/0 to be
a uniquely defined real number like π/
√
2; 0/0 is a (possibly) meaningful real
number only after Cauchy sequences representing the zeroes in the numerator
and denominator are specified. The definitions of the real zeroes in the numera-
tor and denominator that we provide are only a means for making an axiomatic
assertion of the value of 0/0, in tune with the Main Postulate.
We have defined real numbers as Cauchy sequences of rationals representing
points on the real line and also the usual arithmetic operations on these. Next
let us consider how one may quantify over specific collections of real numbers on
the real line in NAFL. We will denote such collections as ‘super-classes’, since
the reals do not constitute a class in NAFL (being themselves proper classes).
Definition 2. A super-class I of real numbers that has a geometric representa-
tion on the real line is defined by specifying a constant sequence S of rationals
that has precisely I as its (super-class of) limit points. Different sequences S
may be used to represent I in different instances. Here I may be a finite col-
lection of reals, an infinite sequence, or an interval (finite or infinite or semi-
infinite), or a combination of these.
The key point of Definition 2 is that only entities I which have a geometric
representation on the real line may be defined as super-classes, as noted below.
Proposition 4. Every super-class I of real numbers defined in Definition 2 must
necessarily be closed, i.e., include all of its limit points. In particular, open or
semi-open intervals of reals, or sequences of reals excluding their limit points,
cannot be represented in NRA. Note that such entities do not have a geometric
representation, e.g. there is no way to geometrically specify an open/semi-open
interval of reals by a diagram. Similarly, the rationals, when viewed as real
numbers in the above geometrical sense, do not constitute a super-class; any
sequence S that includes all rational points represents the entire real line.
Proof. This is immediate from Definition 2. Any sequence S of rationals that
has all the elements of an open/semi-open interval of reals as its limit points
must also have the end-points of such an interval as its limit points; this is a
classically known result. Similarly, if the sequence S of rationals has an infinite
sequence 〈ρj〉 of reals as its limit points, it must also have the limit points of
〈ρj〉 as its limit points.
Remark 7. The sequence S of Definition 2 has two roles, namely: (a) As a
sequence of rationals specified by a definite property in NPAR, without any
reference to real numbers, and (b) As a super-class I of reals when viewed
metamathematically from ‘outside’ NPAR, i.e., in NRA. In the latter case, one
must view S as a simultaneous specification of all of its Cauchy subsequences
that represent the super-class I. Thus S satisfies our notion of an infinite class
outlined in Remark 4. Indeed, when the theory NPAR constructs S, it has also
unavoidably constructed every subsequence of S in a metamathematical sense.
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This argument justifies the constructive methods used in the NAFL version
of real analysis (NRA); there is no other way, given Proposition 3. Cantor’s
diagonalization argument for the uncountability of reals is not legal in NRA
(and cannot even be formulated in NPAR), because quantification over reals is
not permitted; there is no ‘cardinality’ for a super-class of reals. In fact there is
no ‘list’ of reals in NRA, i.e., there is no way to establish a mapping between any
super-class of reals and the natural numbers N because of the above restriction
on quantification.
Remark 8. Note that Definition 2 requires us to extend the meaning of the
equality relation =R in NRA (see Definition 1) as follows. Two super-classes of
reals represented by sequences 〈qn〉 and 〈q′n〉 of rationals are equal if and only
if they have precisely the same (super-class of) limit-points. If 〈qn〉 and 〈q′n〉
happen to be Cauchy sequences, this modified definition of equality does agree
with that in Definition 1. However, the notion of ‘having the same super-class
of limit points’ cannot be formalized within an NAFL theory, such as, NPAR,
because it would require quantification over reals. This is precisely why NRA
must remain a metatheory that appeals to geometric concepts and not a formal
NAFL theory of reals (which cannot exist).
Remark 9. The fact that the rationals, when represented metamathematically
as reals, do not constitute a super-class in NAFL (see Proposition 4) means
that we cannot consider the rationals as having a separate identity from the
real numbers, under a geometric interpretation. The rationals have a purely
arithmetical construction in NPAR as ordered pairs of integers, but they are
not points on the real line (or solutions of polynomial equations that permit
reals as solutions, etc.) when viewed in this sense. Their construction in NPAR
as ordered pairs of integers is required only for the purpose of defining the reals
and such a construction does not imply geometric numberhood for the rationals.
When viewed as points on the real line or in any other geometric sense, the
rationals must always be viewed as reals, and do not constitute a super-class
by themselves. E.g. it is not valid in NAFL to talk of all the ‘rational points’
in the interval [0,1], for no construction is possible for such a super-class of real
numbers. Similarly, integer points on the real line must always be viewed as real
numbers. Any super-class that includes all integer points on the real line must
also include ±∞, where one may define ±∞ as real numbers represented by
appropriate unbounded sequences of rationals. E.g., an instance is given below:
±∞ =R 〈±Q((n, 0), (1, 0))〉, where n ∈ N.
Remark 10. One may wish to represent arbitrary real numbers belonging to a
super-class in NRA, say, for stating identities like x + y =R y + x or x =R x.
Such a representation is possible if one provides a construction for such an ar-
bitrary real number in the super-class. This is accomplished in NAFL by using
the Main Postulate; an arbitrary real number x in a super-class is taken to be
in a superposed state of assuming all possible values in the super-class until the
human mind specifies a value for it [2]. Thus x, when unspecified, has the same
construction as the super-class itself, i.e., as a sequence of rationals with the
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entire super-class as its only limit points. One may verify that this construction
works when one performs operations like x+ y =R y + x, with the usual arith-
metical operations defined similarly to Definition 1. The operations are defined
even when we specify y in the above example while letting x be arbitrary, or let
both x and y be arbitrary; however, note that in these latter instances one needs
to interpret =R as defined in Remark 8. It must be emphasized that arbitrary
real numbers can only be defined within legitimate super-classes of NRA. For
example, the following seemingly innocent proposition of classical real analysis
is illegitimate in NRA when x is left arbitrary:
1/x >R 0⇒ x >R 0. (5)
One might attempt to represent x here as an arbitrary real number in [−∞,+∞],
which is a legitimate super-class of NRA. Indeed whenever we specify x as a
positive or a negative real number (via appropriate Cauchy sequences of ra-
tionals), (5) does hold. However, when we leave x unspecified, it is in a su-
perposed state of all possible values as required by NAFL and this includes
positive, negative and zero real numbers; hence x is represented in NRA by
the super class [−∞,+∞]. In this instance, NAFL would require that both
1/x >R 0 & 1/x ≤R 0 and x >R 0 & x ≤R 0 hold in NRA. But then it follows
that 1/x >R 0 & x ≤R 0 also holds when we leave x unspecified, and this is
formally the negation of (5). This is the reason for the illegality of (5) in NRA.
Note also that when we specify x = 0 (by an appropriate Cauchy sequence of
rationals) in NRA, one could have 1/x = +∞ >R 0, which again results in the
falsity of the above assertion. Hence restricting x to the super-class [0,+∞] of
reals also fails to rescue (5) in NRA. The reason (5) fails to be legitimate in NRA
is that it attempts to create a super-class (0,+∞] that does not exist in NRA.
However, restricting x to other super-classes of strictly positive reals (such as,
[1,+∞]) will make (5) legitimate in NRA, provided >R is appropriately defined
when x is left arbitrary within this super-class. One may also easily verify that
when (5) is modified to the proposition
1/x ≥R 0⇒ x ≥R 0,
it can indeed legitimately be asserted as true in NRA when x is restricted to
be an arbitrary real number in [0,+∞]. In this case, one must define ≥R such
that x ≥R 0 is true when x is left unspecified (and hence is represented by the
super-class [0,+∞]).
Remark 11. One may extend the above definitions on the real line to the Eu-
clidean plane or to three-dimensional Euclidean space by defining points as
Cauchy sequences of ordered pairs or triples of rationals that converge to the
real coordinates of the points. One may then define complex numbers, partial
derivatives and functions of reals (including discontinuous ones) that have a geo-
metric representation, by an obvious extension of the results given in this paper.
The arbitrary variables defined in Remark 10 are also needed to define functions.
For example, to represent a function as y = f(x), one needs a sequence of pairs
of rationals such that it has every pair of values (x, f(x)) as its (super-class of)
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limit points. Further given any specific x within the super-class representing
the domain, the formula f(x) generates the value y of the function. Finally, if
x is left unspecified, its value is by definition the super-class representing the
domain, and the value of f(x) is the super-class representing the range of the
function. The domain and range of f(x) must be legitimate super-classes of
NRA. Discontinuous functions in NRA will take on multiple values at points of
discontinuity, as the classical representation using (semi-) open intervals is not
possible; hence these are not functions in the classical sense. For example, to
represent the step function
y = 1, for x < 0; y = 2, for x > 0; y = [1, 2] for x = 0,
one needs a sequence 〈qn, q′n〉 of ordered pairs of rationals such that the (classi-
cal) limit points of these sequences are pairs of real numbers of the form (x, 1)
for each x ≤ 0 and (x, 2) for each x ≥ 0. Further one should also be able to
extract the pair (0, y) as limit points of the above sequence, for each y satisfying
1 ≤ y ≤ 2. The above should, of course, be the complete super-class of limit
points of 〈qn, q′n〉. Here we have taken y = [1, 2] as the super-class representing
the ‘value’ of the function at x = 0, to conform with the usual diagrammatic
representation of the step function.
Remark 12. Note that proofs about operations on real numbers may, in general,
be obtained diagrammatically. Diagrammatic concepts from Euclidean geome-
try are taken to be consistent and a priori true in NRA, before translation into
NPAR. As an example, see [15] for a suggested diagrammatic proof of Euclid’s
fifth postulate from the first four, in plane geometry. The basic idea of this proof
is as follows. Given a line L and a point P of the plane that is not on L, one can
deduce from Euclid’s first four postulates the existence of infinitely many line
segments of a line M , each of which is parallel to L; further, this collection of
line segments includes all the points of M . In NAFL, this implies the existence
of M itself. In order to translate this proof in NRA, one is faced with a seem-
ing problem: how does one quantify over line segments, which are themselves
super-classes? For example, one needs a representation of infinitely many line
segments of the form [−1, 1], [−2, 2], [−3, 3], . . . in NRA. The appropriate repre-
sentation in this case is achieved by two sequences, one of which is a sequence
of rationals that has the entire real line as its limit points and the other is a
sequence of pairs of rationals having the limit points (−1, 1), (−2, 2), (−3, 3), . . .
(representing the end-points of the line segments). In particular, the second
sequence must also include (−∞,+∞) as its limit point; this is the proof of the
fact that the entire line must necessarily be included in any representation of
its line segments that includes all the points of the line.
Remark 13. In several previous papers [9, 15, 10, 4] we have highlighted the fact
that special relativity theory (SRT) cannot be formalized as a consistent theory
of NAFL. The present paper provides one more such argument, as follows. SRT
requires that a particle can, in principle, acquire all velocities strictly less than
c, the velocity of light, but the particle velocity can never equal c. Formalization
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of this result requires the existence of the semi-open interval of reals [0, c). By
Proposition 4, such a semi-open interval of reals does not exist in NRA.
Definition 3. The derivative dy/dx in NRA may be reduced to a particular
means of defining 0/0 as outlined in Remark 6. The classical limit of a sequence
of reals of the type {∆y/∆x} cannot be separated from the sequence itself in
NRA (see Proposition 4); the limit in fact represents 0/0. Given y = f(x) and
a particular value of x, one defines ∆x = 0 as a specific Cauchy sequence of
rationals, and then computes ∆y = f(x+∆x)−f(x) as another Cauchy sequence
representing zero. Performing the division ∆y/∆x yields dy/dx at that value of
x. Similarly, integration in NRA is an operation of the type 0×∞.
Remark 14. A detailed exposition of the calculus and the theory of functions
of a real variable in NRA will be dealt with in future work. The derivative,
of course, has the geometric interpretation of the slope of a curve. It is eas-
ily seen that essentially every object of Euclidean geometry (whether plane or
three-dimensional) can be translated into NPAR via NRA. As an example of
the derivative, consider y = f(x) = x2. Performing the operation noted in
Definition 3, one obtains
∆y =R f(x+∆x)− f(x) =R 2x∆x+ (∆x)2
dy
dx
=R
∆y
∆x
=R 2x+∆x =R 2x,
where ∆x and x are to be replaced by specific Cauchy sequences of rationals
representing the real numbers zero and x respectively. Observe that x may
also be left arbitrary within a legitimate super-class of NRA (see Remark 10).
It is extremely important to note that the functional representation y = f(x)
must output a specific Cauchy sequence for y when a Cauchy sequence for x is
substituted into f(x). This does happen in the above example. Note also that
the cancellation of ∆x, representing zero, from the numerator and denominator
of ∆y/∆x has no bearing on the final outcome; it is a legal operation in NRA.
Remark 15. The Weierstrass ǫ − δ argument for the derivative dy/dx requires
the existence of open intervals of reals and therefore fails in NRA. The NAFL
version of real analysis excludes the paradoxes of classical real analysis, all
of which arise from the assumption that non-closed super-classes of reals, in
particular, open/semi-open intervals, exist. As an example, consider one of
Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, in which Achilles chases the tortoise and seemingly
never catches up with it despite running at a higher velocity. This paradox only
arises when one considers Achilles as reaching, and being confined to, infinitely
many locations (points) at all of which the tortoise must always be ahead. But
such a super-class of points does not exist in NRA; every attempt to represent
such a super-class by the NAFL definition will result in its classical limit point
to also be included in it (by Proposition 4), and Achilles does catch up with
the tortoise at this limit point. Similarly the paradoxes of classical measure
theory, such as, the Banach-Tarski paradox, can also be attributed to requiring
non-closed super-classes of reals that do not exist in NRA.
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Remark 16. It is worth highlighting the fundamental reasons for the paradoxes
of classical real analysis and precisely how they are resolved in NRA. Let us
consider again Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. The essential paradox here arises
from the fact that infinitely many finite, non-zero intervals of real numbers sum
to a finite interval in classical real analysis. For example, consider the following
infinite sequence of real intervals (in either space or time):
[0, 1/2], [1/2, 3/4], [3/4, 7/8], . . .
If the above intervals are ‘stacked’ side by side, one gets the real interval [0, 1],
reflecting the fact that 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + · · · = 1. But note that each of the
above intervals is finite, non-zero and non-infinitesimal (infinitesimals do not
exist in NRA because NAFL does not permit nonstandard models of NPA). If
there are indeed infinitely many such intervals (as classical real analysis asserts,
by mapping these to the class of natural numbers N), then how can their sum
be an interval of finite length? For a related paradox, consider the sequence of
nested intervals
[−1, 1], [−1/2, 1/2], [−1/4, 1/4], . . .
Note that classically, each of these nested intervals contains infinitely many
(in fact, uncountably many) points. Then how can the intersection of these
intervals contain only a single point, namely, zero? NAFL answers both of
these paradoxes as follows. In each instance, the mapping of the real intervals
to N is not legal in NRA as it amounts to quantification over intervals of reals.
When one attempts to construct either of the above sequences of intervals in
NRA by the method noted in Remark 12, one finds that the interval [1, 1] or
[0, 0] respectively of zero length must necessarily get included. This immediately
explains these paradoxes, for it is not possible in NRA to assert that there exist
infinitely many finite, non-zero intervals that sum to a finite interval, as in the
above examples. Secondly, it is not even legal in NRA to ask how many intervals
exist (including [1, 1] or [0, 0]) in each of the above sequences of intervals, when
one constructs them legally in NRA. Such a question assumes that it is legal to
quantify over intervals of reals, whereas it is illegal to even quantify over real
numbers in NRA.
Chaitin [16] cites the paradoxes of classical real analysis and the incom-
pleteness results of Go¨del, Turing and himself as reasons why the classical real
number system must be abandoned. Lynds [17] asserts that there are no ‘in-
stants’ of time in the real world, which means that Zeno’s paradoxes cannot
even be formulated. These authors have essentially rejected the continuum as
aphysical; it is interesting to compare their arguments with the NAFL approach
to real analysis presented in this paper.
Remark 17. Exponentiation of reals (or rationals) with rational exponents is
relatively straightforward to define. But exponentiation with real exponents
seems problematic in NPAR and will be analyzed in future work.
Remark 18. As an interesting application of real analysis in NAFL, consider
Fermat’s Last Theorem (FLT). This may be put in the form that rn + sn = 1
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has no solutions in the positive rationals r and s for integers n ≥ 3. Let us fix
n and s to be specific constants, and consider a sequence of rationals {rj}, such
that the limit of this sequence is a real number φ that solves φn + sn = 1; FLT
requires that no member of the sequence {rj} should solve this equation. But we
have seen from Remark 9 that the rationals, when substituted into polynomial
equations that permit reals as solutions, must be considered as reals. So FLT
requires that a super-class of reals {rj} must exist that fails to solve the above
equation, while its limit point does solve it. This amounts to requiring that
the limit point of this purported super-class must be excluded from it, but this
is not possible by Proposition 4. One concludes that the truth of FLT cannot
be meaningfully represented if the geometric interpretation of real numbers is
imposed upon Peano Arithmetic (NPA). Therefore NAFL requires that any
proof (or refutation) of FLT must be carried out entirely within NPA, without
invoking real numbers. This reinforces our earlier conclusion of Remark 3 that
consistency of NPA demands its completeness.
Remark 19. Simpson [8] (with his subsystems of second-order arithmetic), Fefer-
man [11, 12] (predicativism) and Weaver [13, 14] (mathematical conceptualism)
have all attempted to restrict classical infinitary reasoning so as to eliminate
the set-theoretic paradoxes. The fundamental difference between the NAFL
approach of this paper and those of the above authors is that NAFL does not
accept the existence of infinite sets and quantification over (infinite) proper
classes. Neither does NAFL accept the notion of an arbitrary infinite class (as
a free variable), which amounts to quantification in NAFL. The point we wish
to make here is that quantification over proper classes is fundamentally and
unavoidably part of infinitary reasoning and so stands rejected by NAFL, as
noted in the proof of Proposition 3. From the NAFL point of view, we dis-
pute Simpson’s [8] claim that he has achieved partial realizations of Hilbert’s
program (to justify classical infinitary reasoning from the finitary standpoint)
because Simpson has really used infinitary methods. In fact NAFL shows that
Hilbert’s program is decisively settled negatively (see also [2]); classical infini-
tary reasoning stands refuted from the strictly finitary standpoint developed
in NAFL. We also mention in passing that Weaver [14] has severely criticized
Feferman’s [12] approach to predicativism. We honestly believe though, that
neither Weaver’s nor Feferman’s approach is predicativism in the strict sense;
they accept the existence of infinite sets of natural numbers, which are essen-
tially impredicative objects from the NAFL standpoint (see Sect. 2). In fairness
to these authors, they have characterized their approach as predicativism ‘given
the natural numbers’.
5 Foundations of Computability Theory in NAFL
Here we will outline the basic arguments in [4, Sects. 6 and 7], and establish the
connection with real analysis in NAFL. A Turing machine (TM), by definition,
must either halt or not halt. If P is the proposition that a given TM halts,
then P ∨ ¬P is unavoidably built into the definition of that TM. It follows
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that P cannot be undecidable in any consistent NAFL theory T in which the
existence of that TM is formalized; the non-classical model for T required by
Proposition 1 in which P&¬P is the case cannot exist, for T must prove P ∨¬P
(and hence, either P or ¬P ). Any infinite (proper) class in an NAFL theory must
be recursive; whether an object belongs to or does not belong to that class cannot
be undecidable in a consistent NAFL theory because such undecidability will
violate the uniqueness required by the axiom for extensionality for classes, which
is an essential ingredient of NAFL theories in which infinite classes exist (e.g. see
Sect. 2, as well as Remarks 4 and 5). Note that the above arguments require the
non-classical features of NAFL, namely, Proposition 1 and the Main Postulate.
It is clear that a new paradigm for computability theory is required in NAFL.
Proposition 5 (NAFL Computability Thesis, NCT). Every infinite (re-
cursive, proper) class that exists in NAFL theories must be effectively com-
putable, i.e., there exists an algorithm that computes it. Here ‘recursive’ or
‘computable’ does not necessarily mean ‘computable by a classical Turing ma-
chine’.
Proof. It is clear that for every element of an infinite class, which is a finite
set, there exists an algorithm that computes it, i.e., it is effectively computable.
Note that nonstandard models of arithmetic do not exist in NAFL; see the proof
of Proposition 2 and Remark 3. Therefore the existence of infinitely many
algorithms that compute every (standard finite) element of an infinite class
implies that the entire infinite class has been computed by these algorithms.
But by Remark 4, these algorithms cannot operate one or finitely many at a
time and complete the computation process; by induction, there will always
exist infinitely many elements remaining to be computed. One concludes that
in NAFL, the existence of infinitely many algorithms as noted above necessarily
implies the existence of an algorithm A that computes the infinite class. One
may think of A as operating on the infinitely many algorithms corresponding
to all elements and ‘parallelizing’ them, so that the infinite class gets computed
simultaneously, rather than finitely many at a time, as required by the NAFL
interpretation of an infinite class (see Remark 4). Note that the nonexistence of
A would leave us with a paradox in NAFL, namely, that a class of algorithms
collectively managed to compute an infinite class, although each of them did
only a finite computation. The above proof of the existence of A required
the non-classical concepts of NAFL, namely, the Main Postulate, Proposition 1
and the nonexistence of nonstandard integers. The proof that every infinite
class must be recursive also required these concepts. Hence A need not be a
classical algorithm, i.e., the infinite class in question need not be computable
by a classical Turing machine.
Remark 20. It is a theorem of classical recursion theory that every recursive
class must be computable by a Turing machine. But many of these standard
results fail in NAFL, whose concepts of ‘computability’ and ‘algorithm’ must
necessarily be different from the classical concepts. Proposition 5 implies that
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Turing’s halting routine H must exist in NAFL. We believe that such an algo-
rithm must be non-classical, not because of Turing’s argument (which fails in
NAFL), but because requiring H to be classical would make it a self-referential
entity that would lead to contradictions in NAFL. Thus NAFL permits hy-
percomputation, and there is a case for believing that H must be a quantum
algorithm, for the following reasons. NAFL also justifies quantum superposition
and entanglement [1, 2, 4], which are non-classical and metamathematical phe-
nomena, i.e., they are confined to the metatheory (semantics) of NAFL theories.
Hence a purported quantum algorithm for H , which only computes the halting
decisions for classical Turing machines, would reside in the metatheory and will
not be a self-referential entity. Secondly, there is evidence that quantum algo-
rithms permit hypercomputation [18] and infinite parallelism [19]. The latter
feature may also be justified by noting that in NAFL, a quantum algorithm is
permitted to access and compute a truly random element of an infinite class.
When such an element is not specified, it must be in a superposed state of as-
suming all values in the infinite class (see Remark 10) and this corresponds to
infinite parallelism.
Remark 21. An interesting analogy is suggested between the rational/real num-
bers on the one hand, and classical/quantum algorithms on the other. It is
known that for every classical algorithm, there is a quantum algorithm that
achieves the same result; the converse of this assertion is controversial and not
necessarily true. The classical and quantum representations of an algorithm
(when they both exist) may be thought of as corresponding to the dual repre-
sentation of a number as a rational and real respectively. As noted in Remark 9,
the rational representation does not have the geometrical significance of a point
on the real line; in a similar sense, the classical representation of an algorithm
merely encodes a meaningless finite string of symbols, rather than an algorithm
that executes. When thought of as an algorithm, the quantum representation
must always be used. This is justified by the fact that the infinitely many clas-
sical algorithms (in the execution mode) by themselves do not constitute a class
because they cannot be separated from the quantum algorithms that ‘paral-
lelize’ them (see Proposition 5, its proof and Remark 20). Quantum algorithms
may be thought of as infinite sequences of the classical representations; these
sequences are only needed to define the quantum algorithms (in the same sense
that reals are infinite sequences of rational representations that are only needed
to define the reals). Such sequences of classical representations may also be used
to define ‘super-classes’ of quantum algorithms, in the same manner that NRA
defines super-classes of reals. An executing algorithm, even when it halts and
has a classical representation, is to be thought of as an infinite object corre-
sponding to its quantum representation. This may be because the machine that
executes the algorithm has an infinite tape, for example; the instruction ‘halt’
may be interpreted as a tacit requirement not to operate further on this infinite
tape. Secondly, the classical model of computation is not valid in NAFL and the
algorithm may at some point access infinitely many execution states at the same
time. A quantum algorithm that does not have a classical representation may
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be thought of as corresponding to an irrational real number. In conclusion, we
observe that important potential applications of the NAFL paradigms for real
analysis and computability theory are in the areas of quantum and autonomic
computing [4].
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By the Main Postulate of NAFL, P (¬P ) can be the case in T if and
only if P (¬P ) has been asserted axiomatically, by virtue of its provability in
T*. In the absence of any such axiomatic assertions (e.g. if T*=T), it follows
that neither P nor ¬P can be the case in T and hence P ∨ ¬P cannot be a
theorem of T. The classical refutation of P&¬P in T proceeds as follows: ‘If
P (¬P ) is the case, then ¬P (P ) cannot be the case’, or equivalently, ‘¬P (P )
contradicts P (¬P )’. But, by the Main Postulate, this argument fails in NAFL
and amounts to a refutation of P&¬P in T*=T+P (T+¬P ), and not in T as
required. Careful thought will show that the classical refutation of P&¬P in T is
the only possible reason for ¬(P&¬P ) to be a theorem of T, and it fails in NAFL.
The intuitionistic refutation of P&¬P in T is flawed and also fails in NAFL, as
will be shown in the ensuing paragraph. By the completeness theorem of FOPL
(which, as noted in Remark 3, is taken for granted as a metamathematical
principle in NAFL) it follows that there must exist a non-classical model for T
in which P&¬P is satisfiable.
Consider the law of non-contradiction as stated in a standard system of in-
tuitionistic first-order predicate logic due to S. C. Kleene, namely,
¬P ⇒ (P ⇒ Q). This formula asserts that from contradictory premises P
and ¬P , an arbitrary proposition Q can be deduced, which is absurd. Hence
¬(P&¬P ) seemingly follows. However, note that in intuitionism, truth is prov-
ability (not necessarily in a specific theory T); together with the intuitionistic
concept of negation, it follows that an assertion of ¬(P&¬P ) is the same as de-
ducing an absurdity from P&¬P , or equivalently, from contradictory premises
P and ¬P . But we have seen that the ‘absurdity’ referred to here is precisely
the fact that any proposition can be deduced, given contradictory premises! The
above ‘proof’ of ¬(P&¬P ) from contradictory premises, mandated by the in-
tuitionistic concepts of truth and negation, is flawed because any proposition
can be so deduced. Note that this ‘proof’ is formally indistinguishable from one
in which ¬(P&¬P ) is substituted for the deduced arbitrary proposition Q. In
NAFL, it is not possible to deduce an arbitrary proposition from contradictory
premises [5] in a non-classical model, and so the flawed intuitionistic argument
for ¬(P&¬P ) fails in any case. Indeed, as explained in [5], the argument for
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deducing an arbitrary proposition would normally proceed as follows:
P&¬P ⇒ P,
P ⇒ P ∨Q,
P&¬P ⇒ ¬P,
¬P&(P ∨Q)⇒ Q.
The final step fails in a non-classical NAFL model for a theory T (in which
P&¬P is the case) because this step presumes ¬(P&¬P ).
Appendix B. The formal system NPA and its ex-
tension NPAR
We will outline the formal system NPA (i.e., the NAFL version of first-order
Peano Arithmetic) along the lines of the description given in Chapter 1 of [8],
suitably modified for our purposes. Throughout, a natural deduction system
of classical first order predicate logic with equality (FOPL) is assumed. The
language of NPA admits number variables, denoted by i, j, k,m, n, . . . , which are
intended to range over the class N of all natural numbers {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Capital
letters L,M,N, . . . , are reserved for constant (infinite) classes; there are no class
variables, and we do not need finite classes for our purposes (though these can be
added if required). These infinite classes are defined by the notation {n : φ(n)},
for each L-formula φ(n) that holds for infinitely many values of n.
The terms and formulas of the language (L) of NPA are as follows. Numerical
terms are number variables, the constant symbols 0 and 1, and t1+ t2 and t1 · t2
whenever t1 and t2 are numerical terms. Here + and . are binary operation
symbols intended to denote addition and multiplication of natural numbers.
Numerical terms are intended to denote natural numbers. Atomic formulas are
t1 = t2, t1 < t2 and t1 ∈ X where t1 and t2 are numerical terms and X is any
(constant) infinite class. The intended meanings of these atomic formulas are
that t1 equals t2, t1 is less than t2, and t1 is an element of X . Formulas are
built up from atomic formulas by means of propositional connectives &, ∨, ¬,
⇒, ⇔ (and, or, not, implies, if and only if) and universal (number) quantifiers
∀n, ∃n (for all n, there exists n). There are no class quantifiers. A sentence is a
formula with no free variables. In writing terms and formulas of L, parentheses
and brackets will be used to indicate grouping and some obvious abbreviations
including the symbols /∈ and 6= and the numbers 2, 3, . . . will also be used for
convenience.
The axioms of NPA are the following L-formulas (universal quantification of
number variables is assumed):
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(i) basic axioms
n+ 1 6= 0
m+ 1 = n+ 1⇒ m = n
m+ 0 = m
m+ (n+ 1) = (m+ n) + 1
m · 0 = 0
m · (n+ 1) = (m · n) +m
¬m < 0
m < n+ 1⇔ (m < n ∨m = n)
(ii) induction axiom scheme (for the L-formulas φ(n))
(φ(0) & ∀n(φ(n)⇒ φ(n+ 1)))⇒ ∀nφ(n)
Note that the L-formulas φ(n) may contain independently defined constant class
symbols. Further, by Remark 3, φ(n) must be a sentence; the free (number)
variables are automatically assumed to be universally quantified in NAFL. By
Proposition 2, NPA must prove the existence of every infinite class C generated
by L-formulas, as indicated by the following theorem scheme, which we will
denote as the theorem scheme of comprehension:
∀n(n ∈ C ⇔ φ(n)).
Here C is the generic notation that stands for {n : φ(n)}. The theorem scheme
applies for each L-formula φ(n) that holds for infinitely many values of n. Note
that φ(n) may not contain C, but could possibly contain other (constant) class
symbols that have been defined independently of C. The given instance of the
theorem scheme says that there exists an infinite class C = {n : φ(n)}, which
is the class of all n such that φ(n) holds. As noted in Remarks 4 and 5, the
‘infinite class’ referred to here is always identified by all of its elements, i.e., it is
always a ‘class’ in the extensional sense and NPA must also prove the axiom of
extensionality for classes in those instances where infinite classes are involved.
The above completes the description of the language L and the axioms of
NPA, whose objects are the natural numbers. The theorems of NPA are deduced
from the axioms using the classical rules of inference. The restrictions required
by NAFL as noted in Sect. 1, and in particular, Sects. 1.1 and 1.2, apply to
NPA.
Next consider the extension NPAR of NPA in order to handle integers, ratio-
nals and sequences of rationals. The language LR of NPAR augments L, firstly
by admitting ordered pairs of natural numbers in the form (m,n), which are
the integers, belonging to the infinite class Z. The axioms for the integers are
as follows (universal quantification over the number variables is assumed):
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(i) equality
(m,n) =Z (i, j)⇔ m+ j = n+ i
(ii) addition
(m,n) +Z (i, j) =Z (m+ i, n+ j)
(iii) negative integers
−Z (m,n) =Z (n,m)
(iv) multiplication
(m,n) ·Z (i, j) =Z (mi+ nj,mj + ni)
(v) zero and one
0Z =Z (0, 0); 1Z =Z (1, 0)
(vi) order
(m,n) <Z (i, j)⇔ m+ j < n+ i
Note that we have avoided mentioning equivalence classes while defining the
integers. Although equivalence classes of pairs of naturals defining specific inte-
gers do exist in NPAR (via the theorem of comprehension), one cannot quantify
over these in NAFL because they are infinite classes. Hence it is not possible
to use equivalence classes to define infinitely many integers in NPAR. Following
Simpson [8, Chap. 1], one may also define Z to be a class of representatives of
the appropriate equivalence classes, e.g.:
Z = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 0), (0, 2), (3, 0), (0, 3), . . .}.
But note that formally, the above definition of Z does not require any mention
of equivalence classes. Thus in NPAR, whenever we formulate a proposition to
hold for all integers, it is to be understood that the proposition is true of all
members of Z in the above form, or alternatively, for all ordered pairs (m,n) as
noted in the above axioms.
The rationals (denoted by the infinite class Q) are defined in NPAR as
ordered pairs (a, b) of integers, where b is restricted to be a positive integer. The
axioms for rationals are as follows (universal quantification over free variables
is assumed).
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(i) equality
(a, b) =Q (c, d)⇔ a ·Z d =Z b ·Z c
(ii) addition
(a, b) +Q (c, d) =Q (a ·Z d+Z b ·Z c, b ·Z d)
(iii) negative rationals
−Q (a, b) =Q (−Za, b)
(iv) multiplication
(a, b) ·Q (c, d) =Q (a ·Z c, b ·Z d)
(v) division
(a, b)/Q(c, d) =Q (a ·Z d, b ·Z c),where c 6= 0Z
(vi) zero and one
0Q =Q (0Z , 1Z); 1Q =Q (1Z , 1Z)
(vii) order
(a, b) <Q (c, d)⇔ a ·Z d <Z b ·Z c
Note that the axiom for division is redundant, but it will be useful for our
purposes in defining division of real numbers. Following Simpson [8, Chap 1],
one may also define Q in NPAR as a class of representatives of equivalence
classes; these representatives may be chosen to be minimal in the sense that all
common factors are cancelled out. Again, Q must be constructively defined in
NPAR without any reference to equivalence classes in order to avoid quantifi-
cation over these.
The idea behind the above definitions of Z and Q within NPAR is that
(m,n) corresponds to the integer m− n, while (a, b) (with b restricted to be a
positive integer) corresponds to the rational a/b.
A sequence of rational numbers is defined to be a function f : N → Q. We
denote such a sequence as 〈qn : n ∈ N〉 or simply 〈qn〉, where qn = f(n). A
Cauchy sequence of rational numbers is a sequence 〈qn : n ∈ N〉 such that
∀ǫ(ǫ > 0⇒ ∃m∀n(m < n⇒ |qm − qn| < ǫ)).
Here ǫ ranges over Q and we have dropped the obvious subscripts on the oper-
ations >, <, −, etc. Propositions 2 and 3 require that NPAR must prove the
existence of every sequence of rationals (including Cauchy sequences) definable
in the language of NPAR. Remarks 4 and 5 apply. Of course, the language
of NPAR must also admit sequences of integers definable by its formulas, and
NPAR must prove the existence of these as well.
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